The aff must prove that affirming the principle stated by the resolution is better justified than negating it. But there are different kinds of justification. Most reasons for accepting a principle have to do with epistemic evidence for the principle’s truth, but we can also have pragmatic reasons for belief. Jordan:

Jeff Jordan, [Professor of Philosophy at the University of Delaware],  "Pragmatic Arguments and Belief in God", The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Spring 2011 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.), URL = <http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/spr2011/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/>. JMN

As with so much in philosophy, the first recorded employment of a pragmatic argument is found in Plato. At *Meno* 86b-c, Socrates tells Meno that believing in the value of inquiry is justified because of the positive impact upon one's character: Meno: Somehow or other I believe you are right. Socrates: I think I am. I shouldn't like to take my oath on the whole story, but one thing I am ready to fight for as long as I can, in word and act—that is, that we shall be better, braver, and more active men if we believe it right to look for what we don't know than if we believe there is no point in looking because what we don't know we can never discover. Meno: There too I am sure you are.[[1](http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pragmatic-belief-god/notes.html" \l "1)] Paraphrased, Socrates' point is if being better, braver, and more active are among our desires, and if believing that inquiry is permissible facilitates our becoming better, braver, and more active, then we have reason, pragmatic reason, to believe that inquiry is permissible. Socrates' argument is an argument for the permissibility of a certain belief, based on the benefits of believing that certain belief. Pragmatic arguments are practical in orientation, justifying actions that are thought to facilitate the achievement of our goals, or the satisfaction of our desires. If among your goals is A, and if doing such and such results in your achieving A, then, all else being equal, you have reason to do such and such: Doing α brings about, or contributes in bringing about, β, and It is in your interest that β obtain. So, you have reason to do α. As presented this is a particular kind of pragmatic argument, a prudential argument. Prudential pragmatic arguments are predicated upon one's preferences or goals or self-interest. As we will see, there are pragmatic arguments that are not narrowly prudential but are moral in nature. Pragmatic arguments are relevant to belief-formation, since inculcating a belief is an action. There are, broadly speaking, two kinds of pragmatic arguments that have to do with belief-formation. The first is an argument that recommends taking steps to believe a proposition because, if it should turn out to be true, the benefits gained from believing that proposition will be impressive. This first kind of pragmatic argument we can call a “truth-dependent” pragmatic argument, or more conveniently a “dependent-argument,” since the benefits are obtained only if the relevant state of affairs occurs. The prime example of a dependent-argument is a pragmatic argument that uses a calculation of expected utility and employs the Expectation Rule to recommend belief: whenever both probability and utility values are known, one should choose to do an act which has the greatest expected utility. Among the various versions of his wager argument, Pascal employs this Rule in a version which states that no matter how small the probability that God exists, as long as it is a positive, non-zero probability, the expected utility of theistic belief will dominate the expected utility of disbelief. Given the distinction between (A) having reason to think a certain proposition is true, and (B) having reason to induce belief in that proposition, taking steps to generate belief in a certain proposition may be the rational thing to do, even if that proposition lacks sufficient evidential support. The benefits of believing a proposition can rationally take precedence over the evidential strength enjoyed by a contrary proposition; and so, given an infinite expected utility, Pascal's Wager contends that forming the belief that God exists is the rational thing to do, no matter how small the likelihood that God exists.

Those pragmatic reasons can be about the consequences of our beliefs but also about the language used to state them. Representations of our language affect our ability to act effectively and interact with others. Haste writes:

Helen Haste, [PhD of Psychology at the University of Bath], “Communitarianism and the Social Construction of Morality”, 1998. NC

Communitarian thinkersstart from a very different psychological tradition. They emphasise the **primacy of language and social interaction in the generation of meaning [is important]**. Taylor argues that **human life is ‘fundamentally dialogic …. We become full human agents, capable of understanding ourselves, and hence defining an identity, through our acquisition of rich human languages of expression.**’ (1991 p 32). This aligns the communitarian ontological position with social constructionists like John Shotter (1993) and Rom HarrZ (HarrZ and Gillett, 1994) who argue that the primary human reality is face-to-face conversation. **If social interaction is the crucible of meaning, then the child learns about morality through discourse and through social practices**, both explicit and implicit. **The ‘meaning’ of something – including the meaning of our own identity and our morality – depends on what is comprehensible and recognized within our social community. Social beings create their identity through shared discourse and language** (Shotter, 1993). Communities are multiple; we are members of many communities which each offer us identity, and personal meaning, and within each different elements and skills are salient. Cultural narratives, stories and traditions feed directly into our identity, signaling valued attributes and behaviours, and giving an explanation for our past and present. Crucially, we also recognize that these are shared by those whom we thus define as members of our community. A moral obligation can only have meaning within a social context. Richard Shweder describes taboos and practices found amongst rural Hindus in India which are quite morally meaningless to Americans, because they are associated with beliefs about pollution which are not shared (Shweder et al, 1987). However practices may be widely condemned, but for different reasons – believing that rape is wrong because it defiles the victim’s purity, is very different from seeing it as wrong because treats her as an object rather than a person.

We have pragmatic reasons to reject the principle of the resolution’s use of the phrase “repeated domestic violence”.

The counter-advocacy is to reject the victim’s use of deadly force in situations of repeated domestic violence and embrace the victim’s use of deadly force in situations of ongoing coercive control.

First, the domestic violence model assumes that women cannot leave because of physical assault, but conceals the oppressive aspect of abuse, translating into disastrous consequences for victims. Stark:

Evan Stark, [Professor of Human Services and Chair, Department of Urban Health Administration at Rutgers University], *Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life*, Oxford University Press, 2007. BB

**The limits of current interventions can be directly traced to a failure of vision, not of nerve.** Conservatives attack the advocacy movement for exaggerating the nature and extent of abuse. In fact, because of [the domestic violence model’s] its singular emphasis on physical violence, the prevailing model minimizes both the extent of women’s entrapment by male partners in personal life and its consequences. Viewing woman abuse through the prism **of** the **incident-specific** and injury-based definition of violence has concealed its major components, dynamics, and effects, including the fact **that** it is neither “domestic” nor primarily about “violence.” Failure to appreciate the multidimensionality of oppression in personal life has been disastrous for abuse victims. Regardless of its chronic nature, courts treat each abuse incident they see as a first offense. Because well over 95% of these incidents are minor, in that the physical assault involved is not injurious, almost no one goes to jail. In custody or divorce cases, because abuse is framed as incident specific or as only involving injurious violence, when women or children present with claims based on the ongoing, multidimensional and cumulative nature of abuse, these are often treated as fabricated. Worse, a protective mother may be blamed when her expressed level of concern or fear is at odds with evidence of assault: in the dependency court, her children may be placed in foster care; in family court, she is alleged to be engaged in alienating her children from the “good enough father.” As calls to the police or visits to the emergency room are repeated over time, the helping response becomes more perfunctory and may actually contribute to making abuse routine, a process called normalization.

Two implications. A] Solves for DV --- framing is crucial to preventing ongoing abuse B] Turns the case because aff perpetuates abuse.

Second, “coercive control” acknowledges the oppressive and cumulative aspect of intimate terrorism that “domestic violence” bluntly ignores. Stark 2:

**T**he easiest way to understand coercive control is to contrast it to the widespread equation of partner abuse with “domestic violence.” Domestic violence laws and most research in the field take an incident-specific focus and weigh the severity of abuse by the level of force used or injury inflicted, what I call a “calculus of harms.” In marked contrast, the coercive control model relies on evidence that most battered women who seek help experience coercion as “ongoing” rather than as merely “repeated” and that the main marker of these assaults is their frequency or even their “routine” nature rather than their severity, a fact that gives abuse a “cumulative” effect found in no other assault crime. Physical harm and psychological trauma remain important in the coercive control model. **But [the coercive control]** its **theory** of harms **replaces the violation of physical integrity with an emphasis on violations of “liberty” that entail the deprivation of rights and resources essential to personhood and citizenship.** In this view, the psychological language of victimization and dependence is replaced by the political language of domination, resistance, and subordination. . In the coercive control model, what men do *to* women is less important than what they prevent women from doing for themselves.

This turns the case because “repeated domestic violence” contributes to a culture that is hostile to victims.

Permutation can’t solve- the mention of violence blinds us to the oppression involved so the permutation would still link. Stark:

Evan Stark, [Professor of Human Services and Chair, Department of Urban Health Administration at Rutgers University], *Coercive Control: How Men Entrap Women in Personal Life*, Oxford University Press, 2007. BB

Control: Invisible in Plain Sight The victims and perpetrators of coercive control are easily identified. Many of the rights violated in battering are so fundamental to the conduct of everyday life that is hard to conceive of meaningful human existence without them. How is it possible then that it has attracted so little attention? I have already pointed to the prominence of the domestic violence model. Another explanation is the compelling nature of violence. Once injury became the major medium for presenting abuse, its sights and sounds were so dramatic that other experiences seemed muted by comparison. The radical feminists who led the fight against rape and pornography also inadvertently contributed to the invisibility of coercive control. Placing so much political currency on violence against women as the ultimate weapon in men’s arsenal made it a surrogate for male domination rather than merely one of its means. It was a short step to replacing the political discussions of women’s liberation with the talks of “victims” and “perpetrators.” Another explanation for why coercive control has had such little impact is that no one knows what to do about it.

The role of the ballot is to question the affirmative’s rhetorical choices --- naming of domestic violence is dire to public response and conceptualizing violence. Fountain et al-

Kim Fountain et al [PH.D, Deputy Director New York City Anti-Violence Project], "Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, Transgender and Queer Domestic violence in the united states in 2008" The National Coalition of Anti-Violence Programs www.avp.org/documents/2008NCAVPLGBTQDVReportFINAL.pdf FD

**The naming of domestic violence is important not only in identifying and claiming the issue to be of serious public importance and thus the target of a public response, but also in the meanings and potential implications of the language used**. For instance, Itzin (2000) suggests that “how violence is conceptualized and defined will determine what is visible and seen and known . . . and what is and is not done about it through policy and practice**”** (p. 357). Similarly, **the ways in which domestic violence is named, even the very terms used, can have specific implications with regard to whose experience is named and whose is not**.